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IN DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REPUBLICANISM: A REPLY TO
CRITICISMS OF OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth).
Randy E. Barnett1
I am supremely grateful to the University of Illinois College
of Law’s Program in Constitutional Theory, History, and Law,
directed by my friend Kurt Lash, and to Constitutional
Commentary and its editor Jill Hasday, for the honor of convening
and publishing this symposium on my book, Our Republican
Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the
People.2 I am also enormously appreciative to the authors of the
papers that appear in this volume: Jud Campbell, Jack Balkin,
Jason Mazzone, Amy Coney Barrett, Sanford Levinson, and my
colleague Lawrence Solum. Their commentaries are uniformly
insightful, constructive, and stimulating. They have caused me to
think more deeply about the many issues they have raised—so
many issues that this reply can only touch on the highlights.
Rather than attempt to be comprehensive, I aim instead to use
their critiques as a springboard to clarify the claims I make in Our

1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center
for the Constitution. An early version of these remarks were presented at the “Symposium
on Our Republican Constitution,” which was held at the University of Illinois College of
Law, in Champaign, Illinois on March 18, 2016. The symposium was jointly-sponsored by
Illinois’ Program in Constitutional Theory, History, and Law, and the Georgetown Center
for the Constitution. Permission to reprint or distribute this essay for nonprofit educational
purposes is hereby granted.
2. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
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Republican Constitution and, where possible, to look for common
ground.
JUD CAMPBELL
There is much to admire and like in Jud Campbell’s article
Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding.3 I found his
treatment of Founding Era sources discussing natural rights and
social contractarianism to be nuanced and fascinating. And I
agree with large swaths of what he says. Where I may disagree,
however, would require an exegesis of Founding Era sources that
would necessitate a deeper dive into those sources than I am
prepared to make or could present here if I was. So let me confine
myself to two points he may want to think about for his future
work, and a general observation about the qualified nature of his
thesis.
First, while he admirably presents a wide diversity of sources
in a remarkably coherent way, he never attempts to resolve some
of the fundamental differences in approaches to which he alludes.
While I share his view that, when it came to first principles, the
Founding generation agreed on much and that their
disagreements should not be exaggerated, disagree they did:
especially on the scope of the implied powers of the federal
government. That was what the debate over the first bank was all
about.
And yet, at the end of his paper, Campbell is seemingly able
to reach a unitary conclusion regarding their views of the status of
natural rights. As he concludes, “[m]ost retained natural rights
were therefore individual rights that could be collectively defined
and exercised by legislatures, with virtually no room for judicial
oversight. In the end, Founding-Era natural rights were not really
‘rights’ at all . . . .”4 I think his conclusion is a little too confident,
even in light of the discourse he so admirably summarizes, but also
in light of some items he does not mention.
I will limit myself to one set of statements from Madison. In
a footnote of his essay, Campbell quotes Madison’s Bill of Rights
speech where he said that “it is for [Congress] to judge of the

3. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 85 (2016).
4. Id. at 111–12.
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necessity and propriety” of laws.5 And Madison does make this
statement in the context of discussing why certain means—like
the use of general warrants as a means of raising revenue—should
be restricted by adding certain positive rights, which Campbell
calls “constitutional rights.” Here, the end of “raising revenue” is
undoubtedly a proper one as it was enumerated.
Yet, in his bank speech delivered to that very same Congress,
Madison invokes the Ninth Amendment “as guarding against a
latitude of interpretation”6 of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
with respect to whether a monopoly grant to a bank was properly
within the power of Congress. One possible way to reconcile these
positions is that, as these statements were made during a
congressional debate, whether or not a monopoly is “proper” is
solely for the Congress to debate and decide, and not for the
courts.
Years later, however, in a letter to Spencer Roane
responding to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch
upholding the National Bank Act that Madison had signed into
law as president, Madison condemned “the high sanction given
to a latitude in expounding the Constitution,” and in particular
to “a legislative discretion” as to the means “to which no practical
limit can be assigned.”7 And he then expressly criticized
Marshall for his assertion of judicial restraint: “Does not the
court also relinquish, by their doctrine, all control on the
legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers?” Equating
“necessity” with mere convenience, wrote Madison, would place
the matter “beyond the reach of judicial cognizance. . . . By what
handle could the court take hold of the case?”8
So Madison apparently saw an important role for courts in
holding Congress to its enumerated powers—a role so important
that it could be cited against an interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause that was not judicially administrable. And he
took issue with Marshall’s reasoning on this question in a case that
reached an outcome with which he agreed!
Further, it is revealing that, when Marshall later sought in
his series of pseudonymous newspaper essays to defend himself
5.
6.
7.

See id. at 108, n. 113 (quoting James Madison).
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (Rep. J. Madison).
Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS &
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, at 143 (New York, R. Worthington 1884).
8. Id. at 144.

9 - BARNETT_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

210

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

1/3/17 9:11 AM

[Vol. 32:207

from this charge, he denied (perhaps disingenuously) equating
“necessary” with “convenience”: “The court does not say that the
word ‘necessary’ means whatever may be ‘convenient,’ or
‘useful.’”9 He then specifically rejects the view that the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint or “modesty” and
deferred to Congress’s own assessment of the scope of its powers:
Would Amphyction himself be content with the declaration of
the Supreme Court that, on any question concerning the
constitutionality of the act, It is enough to say “it is not
consistent with judicial modesty” to contradict the opinion of
Congress, and “thus to arrogate to themselves the right of
putting their veto upon a law”. . .?10

To the contrary, Marshall maintained, it “was incumbent on them
to state their real opinion and their reasons for it.”11
In a later essay, Marshall doubled down on the Court’s
assertion that it would fall to the judiciary to assess whether
Congress was exercising an enumerated power in good faith, or is
instead acting pretexually:
In no single instance does the court admit the unlimited power
of congress to adopt any means whatever, and thus to pass the
limits prescribed by the Constitution. Not only is the discretion
claimed for the legislature in the selection of its means, always
limited in terms, to such as are appropriate, but the court
expressly says, “should congress under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects, not
entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty
of this tribunal . . . to say that such was not the law of the land.12

Marshall also implicated the concept of good faith in defense
of using “convenient” as a synonym for “necessary”: “When so
used, they signify neither a feigned convenience nor a strict

9. John Marshall, A Friend to the Union, PHILA. UNION, Apr. 28, 1819, reprinted in
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 100 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969). This seems a positively bizarre claim in light of McCulloch’s oft-quoted passage:
“the word ‘necessary’ . . . frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or
useful, or essential to another.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413
(1819). Any attempt to reconcile these statements is beyond the scope of this reply.
10. Marshall, A Friend to the Union (Apr. 28, 1819), in GUNTHER, supra note 9, at
105.
11. Id.
12. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5,
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 100
(Gerald Gunther ed.,1969) 186–87.
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necessity; but a reasonable convenience, and a qualified
necessity . . . .”13
A judicial willingness to invalidate pretextual assertions of
power for the common good is exactly what I am advocating in
Our Republican Constitution (pp. 231-245). While I would not
want to place too much weight on particular statements by
Madison, Marshall, or anyone else, I think the matter of the
judicial role in holding legislatures to their “just powers” was, at
minimum, more contestable, or at least in flux, at the founding
than Campbell’s unqualified conclusion seems to assert.
My second point concerns the role that the concept of
“presumed consent” played in discussions of consent, which
Campbell addresses only in passing. For me, this was a key
discovery that I believe has long been overlooked in discussions
of the role played by natural rights in limiting legislative power.
As Justice Samuel Chase explained in Calder, the only way
implied consent of the individual to legislative power can be
“presumed” or deemed to be unanimous, is if legislatures of
general powers are limited by the unenumerated “great first
principles.”14 For example, a law “that punished a citizen for an
innocent action,” or “a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful
private contracts of citizens,” or “a law that makes a man a Judge
in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it
to B” is merely an “ACT of the legislature (for I cannot call it a
law).”15
Why not? Given the consent of the governed to legislatures
of general powers, why are such “acts” not “laws”? Because, said
Chase, “[i]t is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust
a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be
presumed that they have done it.”16 In other words, because the
unanimous consent of the people is merely “presumed,” such
consent is by its nature limited, even without expressed limitations
on powers being included in a written constitution.
In a like manner did Attorney General Edmund Randolph
use such reasoning to conclude that a national bank was beyond
the power of Congress to enact. In his opinion to President
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
Id. at 388.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Washington, Randolph contended that even a textually
unqualified grant of legislative power “does not affect any of
those paramount rights, which a free people cannot be supposed
to confide even to their representatives.”17
In short, the fact that the consent of each individual can, at
best, only be presumed provides a limit on the powers that can be
claimed by legislatures who presume to govern on his or her
behalf. Although the role that judges may play in enforcing such
a limit is a separate question, the inherently bounded nature of
presumed consent is an important conceptual prerequisite to the
judicial duty to nullify ultra-vires statutes.
Finally, Campbell couches his critique carefully in ways that
make it more difficult to rebut, but also potentially consistent with
the portrait of natural rights and presumed consent that I present
in Our Republican Constitution. Here are a few examples (with
my emphases added):
In short, natural rights called for good government, not
necessarily less government.18
Inalienability undergirded the American stance about who
could collect taxes and regulate property, but labeling
something as a “natural right” did not suggest well-defined
limitations on governmental power.19
By contrast, retained natural rights did not impose strict limits
on the powers of representative bodies.20
[T]he historical record shows that they preserved retained
natural rights principally through constitutional structure,
giving legislators, not judges, nearly complete responsibility for
determining their proper scope.21
In this way, the Founders’ “anti-democratic” efforts did not
reflect an understanding of “natural rights” as rigid constraints
on governmental power.22

17. Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmond Randolph, Attorney General of the
United States, to President Washington, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 86 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall, ed., 1932)
(emphasis added).
18. Campbell, supra note 3, at 87.
19. Id. at 98.
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id. at 104.
22. Id. at 105.
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The combination of these principles meant that, both in theory
and in practice, legislatures had virtually unfettered authority
over most retained natural rights.23

Campbell is to be commended for his care in formulating
these conclusions from the evidence he presents. But the
qualifiers he employs leave much room for judges to have some
role in curbing legislators who exceed what the Declaration of
Independence referred to as their “just powers.”
True, natural rights may not have been thought to provide
“rigid” restraints on legislative power, or be legally enforceable as
such. I do not claim otherwise in Our Republican Constitution.
But the continued existence of such rights after the formation of
civil society—which Campbell acknowledges that some, if not
most, of the Founders believed—nevertheless can justify some
outer boundary on the powers of legislatures to restrict the
liberties of the people—even if such limitations were neither
“strict” nor “well defined.”
What then is the proper role of the judiciary in a
constitutional republic in which the people retain their natural
rights? Campbell tells us that “the historical record shows that
they preserved retained natural rights principally through
constitutional structure. . . .”24 In Our Republican Constitution, I
propose that judges are needed to ensure that this structure is
preserved—in particular the limitations on federal power that
defines the reserved powers of the states (in chapters 6 and 7), and
the separation of powers within the federal government (in
chapter 8). Presumably, Campbell has no objection in principle to
these types of judicially-enforceable limits on legislative power as
a means of protecting the natural rights retained by the people.
Only in Chapter 9 do I discuss another outer boundary on
legislative power: no individual can be presumed to have
consented to their liberty being restricted by irrational and
arbitrary edicts, which cannot properly be considered to be laws.
Of course, where one draws the line on what is irrational and
arbitrary is not always obvious (though sometimes it is pretty
clear, as Sandy Levinson concedes25), and we can employ various
presumptions to reach results in actual litigation. But it seems
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 108.
Id. at 104.
See infra text accompanying note 70.
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plain from Calder and other sources that the judiciary had some
role to play in protecting the individual sovereign from his agents
acting towards him in such a manner.
True, the abstract nature of natural rights themselves do not
specify which restrictions do not serve the common good because
they are irrational or arbitrary. What is needed is constitutional
law or implementing doctrine to cash out these limits in a
judicially-administrable way. In Chapter 9, I propose that, as was
suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
we are looking to smoke out “pretexual” assertions of power that
were actually enacted to serve the interests of the few over the
common good of everyone (pp. 231-245).
I do not propose, however, that courts directly examine the
motives of legislators. Instead, I suggest they approach laws with
a “realistic” appreciation that statutes and regulations are not
always enacted in good faith, but are often enacted to dispense
benefits to a selected few, or even many, at the expense of
others—as well as other objectives that are beyond the just
powers of any republican legislature. For example, restrictions on
liberty are also enacted simply because legislators do not approve
of the liberty being exercised.
Moreover, at the founding it might have been reasonable to
assume that legislators might deliberate about the constitutional
scope of their powers—as the first Congress did when debating a
national bank—a deliberation of which judges might well be
respectful. Today, however, if legislators pay any attention to the
Constitution at all—and they typically pay none—they merely
debate whether or not the courts will uphold their acts. When
courts, in turn, are deferring to legislatures about the scope of
their own powers, while legislatures are deferring to the court’s
willingness to uphold their laws, we have what I call the problem
of “double deference,” where no one is assuring that legislatures
are remaining within their just powers (pp. 128-129).
When devising implementing doctrine, courts should be
mindful of this reality. I propose that, to protect the rights
retained by the people, judges should require legislatures to
articulate the proper end they seek to accomplish—a seemingly
reasonable demand—and then examine the fit between the means
adopted and the stated end. And simply helping out a favored
interest group at the expense of either a minority of the people or
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the people as a whole is not a proper end of a legislature in a
republic in which the people themselves retain their natural rights.
By the same token, where different persons are being treated
differentially, courts should ask how this differential treatment of
individuals or groups is justified. What judges should not do, I
maintain, is adopt highly unrealistic and formalist “presumptions”
in favor of legislative power that cannot be rebutted by any
argument or evidence presented by a member of the sovereign
people to an independent and neutral magistrate.
In this way, irrationality and arbitrariness review provides an
outer boundary or guard rails within which legislatures are
entirely free to regulate the exercise of natural rights or liberty in
good faith for the common good. Such an outer boundary of good
faith would seem to fall within the qualifiers that Campbell
attaches to the discretion he says legislatures were thought to have
at the founding: It is not “rigid,” it does not “necessarily” lead to
“less government,” and it “principally” relies on reinforcing the
structure of our Republican Constitution.
But this approach does deny that legislatures have “complete
responsibility for determining” the proper scope of their
delegated powers or that, as servants, they have “unfettered
authority” over the retained liberties of their masters. In short,
such an approach seeks to effectuate what Campbell accurately
calls “the philosophical pillars of republican government.”
JACK BALKIN
Jack is entirely right. This is not an originalist book.26 If it had
been, I would have used evidence in an entirely different way. But
neither is it an historical work that purports to capture the full
meaning of “republicanism.” Rather it is an antidote; an antidote
to an overly-democratic reading of the Constitution and our
“ethos” while imputing that reading and ethos back to the
Founding. (In contrast, it is to Sandy Levinson’s great credit that
he has always had the intellectual integrity to describe the
Constitution as it is, and not as he would like it to be, and then to
judge it accordingly.)

26. See Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST. COMM. 38
(2016).
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For this reason, focusing solely on the “undemocratic” and
even “antidemocratic” aspect of “republicanism”—while setting
to one side the anti-monarchical or anti-aristocratic aspects of
republicanism—has great value. So too is forgoing discussion of
the other eight features he identifies with “classical
republicanism” to focus on one persistent tension that runs from
the Founding up to the present: the tension between “popular
government” to secure the rights of the people and democratic
majoritarianism that can undermine these rights. It is this tension
that Madison set out to examine in his Vices essay.27
That this was not the only issue confronting the Founders, the
generations between them and us, or that confronts us today does
not make it any less important to identify and focus on this single
issue. I chose to do so because it is this issue—as opposed to the
other aspects of republicanism that Balkin identifies—that
underlies much of our present-day thinking of the proper role of
courts.
I admit my book was written for a popular audience and
therefore was limited in how nuanced it could be. Ask my editor
who demanded a complete rewrite after buying the book and
paying a substantial advance for it. But when they move outside
their doctrinal sub-specialties, the political theoretic as well as
historical views of most law professors are pretty much at the level
of the general public. In my experience, nothing reaches law
professors more effectively than a treatment that is written to be
accessible by a first-year law student.
Of course, this would be a problem if my book gets our
“ethos” wrong. Balkin suggests mine does, primarily due to sins
of omission rather than commission, but by sinning nonetheless.
As might be expected, I disagree. The sharp line Balkin draws
between “republicanism” and “classical liberalism” may well be
anachronistic. As Gordon Wood warned, it “is important to
remember that the boxlike categories of ‘republicanism’ and
‘liberalism’ are essentially the inventions of us historians, and as
such they are dangerous if heuristically necessary distortions of a
very complicated past reality.”28

27. See pp. 52–58 (discussing Madison’s The Vices of the Political System of the United
States).
28. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 xi
(2d ed. 1998).
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When discussing “a complicated past reality,” there is
nothing wrong with isolating one particular—and selectively
neglected—feature of that reality. In Our Republican
Constitution, I focus on the fact that the tension between
majoritarianism and fundamental rights does go all the way back.
And what passes for modern notions of majoritarian rule were
rejected by the Founders when they wrote the text of our
Constitution. So recapturing this aspect of republicanism is
independently valuable to supporting a proper appreciation for
our “undemocratic Constitution,” which is necessary to seeing it
accurately interpreted and enforced.
Balkin makes a very useful observation about the
methodology of the book that is worth quoting at length:
Although Barnett quotes the Founders at many points in the
book, his argument is not really an argument about the original
meaning of the Constitution. At least, it is not an argument
from original meaning according to Barnett’s own theory of
how to interpret the Constitution. That theory distinguishes
between discovering the original communicative content of the
Constitution—the task of constitutional interpretation—and
constitutional “constructions,” which fill out, make sense of,
and apply the constitutional text.
Much of the argument of the book is not constitutional
interpretation in the sense described above, because it is not an
exegesis of the original communicative content of the text of
the Constitution. In fact, the document on which Barnett
lavishes the most attention is the Declaration of Independence,
and he takes us through several of its key passages with a focus
that is almost Talmudic in its attentions. Barnett uses the
Declaration to elaborate what he regards as the essential ethos
of the Constitution. According to Barnett’s theory of
constitutional interpretation, this argument is a construction of
the Constitution—albeit the best and most appropriate
construction. Similarly, his “presumption of liberty” is not an
account of the original communicative content of the
Constitution’s text. Rather, it is an important construction
directed at judges and designed to fulfil the Constitution’s
larger purposes.29

This is all exactly right. The only “originalist” claim I might
have made concerns the original public meaning of “We the
People.” But I do not present enough evidence to establish that
29.

Balkin, supra note 26, at 38.

9 - BARNETT_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

218

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

1/3/17 9:11 AM

[Vol. 32:207

the individualist conception of popular sovereignty I identify was
the prevailing view. At best, I have shown that it was an available
view that was sufficiently fundamental and well known—as
evidenced by its expression in the Declaration of Independence—
to render “We the People” irreducibly ambiguous in this regard
and therefore in need of construction.
Balkin then asks, “What kind of argument is Barnett making
then?”30 I like the answer given by my colleague Larry Solum: “In
my view, Barnett and his critics are engaging in what philosophers
of language call ‘metalinguistic negotiation’—the process by
which the meaning of words like ‘republican’ and phrases like
‘republican constitutionalism’ are contested (adversarially) or
negotiated (cooperatively),” the former of which he calls
“metalinguistic contestation.”31A central aim of Our Republican
Constitution, he says, “is to engage in metalinguistic contestation
. . . by articulating a normative constitutional theory and showing
the connections between that theory and various uses of the words
‘republican’ and ‘republicanism’ in both American history and
contemporary constitutional politics.”32
I believe Solum is right to say that I am “entering into
contemporary constitutional politics from a perspective rooted in
constitutional theory and history,” but am speaking “to a
contemporary audience from a contemporary perspective” by
means of a “republican narrative”33: “a story about American
constitutional development that associates [my] normative theory
of constitutionalism with the idea of a ‘republic’ in the sense in
which a republic is contrasted with ‘majoritarian democracy.’”34 If
the argumentative strategy succeeds, “the political identity of
being a ‘Republican’ [today!] will come to be associated with
endorsing the ‘republican constitution’ and opposing the
‘democratic constitution.’”35
Balkin characterizes my “description of republicanism [as] a
remarkable act of historiographical chutzpah.”36 To this, Solum
quite trenchantly responds:
30.
31.
(2016).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 39.
Lawrence B. Solum, Republican Constitutionalism, 32 CONST. COMM. 175, 178
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
Balkin, supra note 26, at 54.
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Barnett is not trying to unearth the historical meaning of the
phrase “republican constitution” in the early republic or
later—rather, his aim is to engage in metalinguistic
contestation that creates new meaning for that phrase.
Structurally, Barnett’s move is similar to the attempt by
progressive constitutional scholars to associate “civic
republicanism” with a contemporary progressive constitutional
theory.37

Precisely! As I mention below in responding to Sandy
Levinson, having successfully captured the flag of “civic
republicanism” in the 1980s for themselves, progressives are
distressed by any narrative that threatens their ownership of the
label “republicanism™.”38
Given all this, Solum finds it unsurprising that I did not
choose the phrase “Our Liberal Constitution” as the title for his
book—as I was urged to do by both Balkin and Sandy Levinson
when they commented on an earlier draft:
Given the contemporary political valence of the term “liberal,”
that title would have been counterproductive, a laughable error
of authorial judgment. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any
members of the intended audience for the book would bother
to read it, if it had that title, whereas a book entitled “Our
Republican Constitution” might grab their attention.
Members of the Republican Party will not endorse “Our
Liberal Constitution”—because the contemporary meaning of
the word “liberal” in political contexts is diametrically opposed
to their political commitments.39

In addition to being right about the fact that my analysis is
not originalist, Balkin is also right that this is a book about today,
and that I did not anticipate the rise of Trumpism when I wrote it.
Indeed, when I began writing the book two years ago, I might
have imagined a clean electoral battle between a Ted Cruz (or a
Rand Paul, for whom I worked as a campaign advisor) against a
Hillary Clinton, in which case, I would have wanted the
Republican Party’s vision of the Constitution to be superior to
that of John Roberts’.
Is this still a worthwhile argument to make in the face of
Trumpism? I think so, but time of course will tell. Trumpism—

37.
38.
39.

Solum, supra note 31, at 178.
See infra at pp. 18–26.
Solum, supra note 31, at 178.
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which is a mixture of Populism and Caesarism—represents about
35-40% of those who voted in open primaries, which includes a
lot of Democrats. Under the voting rules put in place by the
Republican National Committee, perhaps to assist “insider” Jed
Bush against a divided field of “outsiders,” that plurality turned
out to be enough to secure the Republican nomination for a
candidate who had, until recently, been a New York sociallyliberal Democrat reality television personality and relentless selfpromoter.
Yet a significant part of the Republican Party—call it the
conservative Republican intelligentsia—was bitterly, and in the
case of the #NeverTrump folks possibly irredeemably, opposed to
this remaking of the Republican Party. Perhaps it is no
coincidence that conservative commentator George Will, who
wrote the Foreword for Our Republican Constitution, recently
changed his registration from Republican to unaffiliated.40
Moreover, in the final chapter, I also recommend an Article
V convention of the states to propose amendments to restore or
bolster the republican features of our Constitution that have been
undermined by the political processes I describe in my book.
Indeed, eight of the requisite thirty-four state legislatures have
now called for such a convention, and a simulated Article V
convention—drawing commissioners from all fifty states—was
held in Williamsburg, Virginia in September. And, after the 2016
elections, thirty-three state legislatures are now completely in
Republican hands.
Of course, with the election of Trump, I would have expected
many progressives suddenly to rediscover the “republican” nature
of our undemocratic Constitution. Given the liberal use of the
“undemocratic” filibuster by Democrats since they lost control of
the Senate, this is a pretty safe bet. As Balkin puts it, “Trump is a
nightmare version of Barnett’s Democratic Constitution, not
because he is a good-government progressive, but because he is at
heart a Schmittian.”41 While this seems a reasonable bet, only time
will tell if Trump governs as he campaigned. But if he does, as with
the New Dealers who had second thoughts about judicial selfrestraint when the Republicans gained control of Congress in
40. See Maggie Haberman, George Will Leaves the G.O.P. Over Donald Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/us/politics/george-will-leavesthe-gop-over-donald-trump.html?_r=0.
41. Balkin, supra note 26, at 58.
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1946, I expect progressives to be less than enthusiastic about a
Trumpian expression of the Rouseauian General Will that was
embraced by the Democratic Party in the 1830s, which called itself
“the Democracy” (pp. 158-160, 87-88). 42
With the result in 2016, Schmittian Trumpism within the
Republican Party will need to be dealt with. Either the limitedgovernment, constitutionist wing prevails, or a new
“constitutional freedom party” must arise to supplant the
Republican Party the way the Republicans emerged to replace the
Whigs. Although the platform of such a party would have much
more to it than a stance on the Constitution, it would be nice if the
part that deals with the Constitution echoes the themes of my
book.
JASON MAZZONE
Our Republican Constitution presents an argument about
how democratic majoritarianism is not the answer to the problem
of constitutional legitimacy, but the problem that a republican
constitution is needed to solve. Call it “the majoritarian
difficulty.” Constitutional limits on government power are one
way to temper majoritarian abuses of the liberties of We the
People—each and every one. And these liberties include, but are
not limited to, the economic liberty to pursue a lawful occupation
free from irrational or arbitrary restrictions. By enforcing these
limits, as agents of We the People, judges play an important role
in legitimating whatever restrictions on liberty survive meaningful
scrutiny.
In his pithily-entitled, “Me the People,”43 Jason Mazzone’s
principal objection to this proposal is that a single Supreme Court
is not capable of micromanaging a legal system whose doors are
open to florists, hair braiders, casket-making monks, horse
massagers, tour guides, and any other member of We the People
who seeks to earn an honest living in occupations that are not
inherently unlawful. But I confess that I do not entirely
understand the complaint.

42. See also GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS:
FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 39 (2002) (“Van Buren’s concept of democracy was close to
Rousseau’s”).
43. Jason Mazzone, Me the People, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 143 (2016).
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How much extra work would it have taken for the Supreme
Court to have refused to grant cert in Lee Optical of Oklahoma
vs. Williamson44 than to grant cert and rule in Williamson v. Lee
Optical45? True, that would have left it to other federal district
courts to take evidence and fairly decide these cases locally, but
that would seem to be the sort of project they could do—as they
did do in the case itself—and which Mazzone seems to favor with
respect to state courts enforcing federal constitutional rights. So
what’s his beef?
If the issue is that we don’t have enough lower courts to
handle the work, he does not say so. My response to this concern
is the same as Justice Bradley’s retort in his Slaughter-House
dissent to Justice Miller invoking the specter of a flood of
litigation to justify his narrow reading of the Privileges or
Immunities clause:
[E]ven if the business of the National courts should be
increased, Congress could easily supply the remedy by
increasing their number and efficiency. The great question is,
What is the true construction of the amendment? When once
we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect. The
argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very
controlling influence in questions of this sort.46

Or we could free up immeasurable federal court resources simply
by repealing the Controlled Substances Act.
Mazzone posits my claim is “that the Republican
Constitution will be saved if our Supreme Court . . . aggressively
reviews laws and government action for their rationality.”47 But,
as I make clear, such review need not be “aggressive”—an issue
to which I will return when discussing Sandy Levinson’s critique.48
It just needs to be real, not fictitious; actual, not hypothetical. All
the sovereign members of We the People want and deserve as
sovereigns is their day in court in which their judges do not
reflectively side with their servants over them.
But I confess that my biggest disappointment with Mazzone’s
paper is that he fails to deliver on the critique embedded in his
catchy title, “Me the People.” He seems to let that label do all the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
83 U.S. 36, 124 (1873) (Bradley, J. dissenting).
Mazzone, supra note 43, at 152 (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying notes 94–97.
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work. “Me” implies a certain selfishness, or even atomistic
individualism. But I do not deny that legislatures should regulate
in the public good. I merely claim that this is what they must be
doing to be consistent with the presumed consent of We the
People, and sometimes they aren’t.
Recognizing the individual as the ultimate sovereign is no
more or less empowering than recognizing monarchs as the
ultimate sovereign of their nations. Within their own domains
monarchs are free to exercise their will, as well as to enter into
compacts or treaties with other monarchs. The law of nations then
regulates their relations with other sovereigns.
So, too, in the United States where the people themselves are
monarchs. They are presumably free to use what is theirs and
enter into contracts with one another. Domestic law is then there
to stop them from invading the rights of others and to regulate
their actions to prevent such wrongs from occurring.
As I have argued in other places, few progressives would
outlaw private property or private contracts. Instead, they argue
that government should do more.49 Whether or not it should to
more, it seems like a relatively modest proposal, in light of our
republican heritage—not to mention sound moral theory—to
include the rights of property and contract among those that are
to be protected from either majoritarian abuses, or far more
commonly, abuses by entirely unaccountable regulatory boards
that are often captured by the very industries they purport to
regulate—often by legislative design.
AMY CONEY BARRETT
Like Jack Balkin, Amy Coney Barrett is entirely right that I
am not making an originalist case for the Republican versus the
Democratic constitutions.50 Perhaps an originalist case can be
made that the public meaning of “We the People” was
49. See Randy E. Barnett, Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way, 16 CHAP. L. REV.
349, 358 (2013) (“[B]ecause proponents of social justice and legal moralism typically
propose superimposing their schemes onto existing structures of private property and
freedom of contract, rather than supplanting them altogether, these stances are necessarily
more ambitious than simply limiting legal coercion to the libertarian core that must still be
ascertained and enforced.”).
50. See Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST.
COMM. 61, 66 (2016) (“The book is less about what the Constitution’s original public
meaning requires than about what is normatively attractive.”).
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individualist, but Jud Campbell’s article shows how challenging it
would be to establish this. There is one sense, however, in which
originalism does figure into my analysis: The “republican”
conception of the Constitution I identify explains and justifies
certain features of our written Constitution that Levinson and
others have condemned as “undemocratic.”
Put another way, if the original meaning of the text of the
Constitution is undemocratic, the narrative I present helps bolster
the case for adhering to these features rather than treating them
like inkblots. It may well be that the very features of our
Constitution that lead American law professors like Levinson to
prefer Euro-style parliamentary systems—and recommend them
to other countries—is what makes the original meaning of our
Constitution “republican” and therefore good, rather than
“undemocratic” and therefore bad.
Barrett begins by focusing on my claim that courts need to
“realistically assess whether restrictions on liberty were truly
calculated to protect the health and safety of the general public,
rather than being the product of ‘other motives’ beyond the just
powers of a republican legislature.”51 This is necessary, I wrote,
because “[r]equiring the government to identify its true purpose
and then show that the means chosen are actually well suited to
advance that purpose helps to smoke out illicit motives that the
government is never presumed by a sovereign people to have
authorized.”52
To this she responds with a series of questions:
Barnett’s emphasis on the importance of recovering the
legislature’s true purpose understates the complexity of
identifying legislative intent. It is extraordinarily difficult [. . . ]
for a court to glean what was “really” going on behind the
scenes of a statute. A legislature is a multimember body, and
different members may have different motives. Perhaps some
legislators enacting a ban on filled milk were concerned about
its health effects and others were beholden to a powerful dairy
lobby. Whose intent controls? Is such a statute truly calculated
to promote health and safety or is it the kind of rent-seeking
statute that rational individual sovereigns would not
countenance? Do the rent-seeking motives of some legislators

51. BARNETT, p. 125 (her emphasis) (praising the late-18th and early 19th-century
courts that took this approach).
52. P. 232 (my emphases).
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corrupt the statute if other legislators act with the public
welfare in view?53

Given how I expressed myself in the book, this is a point well
taken. Despite my assertion that courts should identify the “true
purpose” of a measure, I do not propose an inquiry into the
subjective motives of a multimember body like the legislature.
What I meant—and wish I had stated more precisely—is that
courts should be cognizant that legislators and regulators
sometimes, and even often, impose restrictions on the liberties of
some of the people for reasons other than the protection of the
health and safety of the public, or some other power they justly
exercise.
Instead, elected legislatures and unelected regulators alike
sometimes invoke the health and safety of the public as a pretext
for channeling special benefits and privileges to a politically wellconnected few. As Barrett notes, in the book, I give several
examples. Indeed, most of the most famous constitutional cases
about economic regulation involve measures enacted for such
illicit reasons.
What I propose is that when restrictions on the liberties of
We the People are challenged, courts should be realistic rather
than formalist about the possibility that such laws were enacted
for what Justice Rufus Peckham described as “other motives.”54
But this is a conclusion he reached not by inquiring directly into
the motives of New York state legislators, but after realistically
assessing and debunking the purported health and safely rationale
for a maximum hours laws just for bakeshop employees—but
neither the bake shop employers who worked in the same
conditions nor employees in other occupations with comparable
working conditions.
So, rather than inquire into the subjective motives of
legislators, courts should require that legislatures commit
themselves to a proper end they claim to be achieving, and then
assess whether the means chosen to meet that end were
“irrational” or “arbitrary.” Although courts do not do so now, it
is not too much to ask legislatures to include the purpose for their
measures in the enactment itself, rather than rely on lawyers to

53.
54.

Barrett, supra note 50, at 70 (footnotes omitted).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
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make up the purposes after the fact in litigation, as courts
currently permit.
Then, courts should examine whether the means chosen
bears a sufficient relation to the stated end. This is an inquiry that
courts make routinely in cases involving judicially-favored
“fundamental rights” or “suspect classes” of persons.55 Again, in
the book, I provide examples of this inquiry in practice, including
the lower court opinion in Lee Optical v.Williamson. And I
contrast this with the Court’s uncritical deference to legislative
assertions of public purpose in Bradwell v. Illinois56 and Plessy v.
Ferguson.57
The search for sufficient means-ends fit is simply too
common a judicial inquiry to be dismissed as impractical for some
liberties and but not for others. The reason for disparate
treatment of different liberties is due to a judicial determination
that some liberties are more worthy of judicial protection than
others. Those who, like Barrett, question placing one’s “faith in
courts” need to explain why judges get to choose some rights as
“fundamental” and some classifications as “suspect” but not
others.
Denying a judicial duty to hold legislatures to within their just
powers in all cases or in no cases would eliminate the reliance on
judicial discretion to identify which rights and liberties deserve
protection. But putting one’s “faith in judges” to choose
meaningful scrutiny in some cases, and fictitious “rational basis”
scrutiny in others, is inconsistent with a professed skepticism of
the “institutional capacity” of judges. I do not see how you can
have it both ways.
Barrett characterizes “the normal functioning of the
legislative process” this way:
The legislature is not an idealized body that acts with one mind,
but a multimember body that produces legislation through a
complex and even chaotic process. Any bill that runs the gamut
of this process represents compromises made along the way,
sometimes to resolve the competing desires of different

55.
56.
57.

See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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constituencies and sometimes because the legislature has
drawn a line somewhere.58

But “resolving the competing desires of different
constituencies” is not, standing alone, a proper legislative purpose
in a constitutional republic in which the liberties of each and every
person merits protection. To this description of the “complex and
even chaotic process,” Barrett might have added that bills are
very often written by industry representatives for staffers, and
then are logrolled past legislators who typically know nothing of
their contents.
Without transparency, how are we supposed to know
whether these “compromises” among the “competing desires of
different constituencies” are proper or improper? In a
constitutional republic in which We the People are the ultimate
sovereign, the persons who are on the coercive end of such
“compromises” have a right to know. And the due process of law
requires them to have the opportunity to contest the necessity and
propriety of such compromises before a neutral magistrate.
Nor are legislators realistically “accountable” for most of
what they do. No legislator has ever been defeated because they
voted for a licensing bill that irrationally or arbitrarily restricted
the liberty of Americans to braid hair, arrange flowers or
furniture, make caskets, or drive a limo. And this is not because
such restrictions have been approved by the general public. It is
because the electorate is ignorant of these acts, has insufficient
interest in them to care, and is only allowed to choose between
two competing parties, each of whom favors an amalgam of
policies, only a handful of which are particularly salient (pp. 176178).59
In light of this, to imagine that these liberties are somehow
“balanced” in the legislative process by legislators who are held
to account by the voters is to engage in magical thinking. The only
time where legislators do consider the constitutionality of their
actions is when restricting a right such as the freedom of speech
that the courts will protect. Only when legislators know that
individual citizens may challenge their actions in court and judges

58.
59.

Barrett, supra note 50, at 73.
See also ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013).
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will be looking over their shoulders do they even discuss the
question of a measure’s constitutionality.
In every other area, legislators employ the artifice of “double
deference”: Courts will defer to the legislature’s assertion of
power and then, when asked if what they do is constitutional,
legislators say “yes, because the courts will uphold us” (pp. 12829). This is as big a fraud on the public as anything that economic
regulation is supposed to prevent.
Barrett asks a very good question: “Would Prigg, Dred Scott,
and Plessy have come out differently if courts had only applied
the standard Barnett proposes? Was it really a misguided
attachment to judicial restraint that drove those cases, or did the
Court see through the same discriminatory lens as the
legislature?”60 To answer this, consider three cases.
The first is the Slaughter-House Cases61 where there was an
extensive record in the Louisiana legislature that the slaughterhouse bill was a good faith public health measure.62 The only
constitutional issue was whether a monopoly given to a private
company was an appropriate means of pursuing a legitimate
legislative purpose. But after the Supreme Court’s ruling refusing
to recognize the right to pursue a lawful occupation as protected
from state abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
entire legislative record was constitutionally irrelevant. Although
the majority in Slaughter-House cited this record, the law would
have been equally constitutional without a single witness being
sworn.
You need not take my word for this. The proof is that the
very next day, in Bradwell v. Illinois,63 the Court relied on its
ruling in Slaughter-House to turn away Myra Bradwell’s claim
that denying her the right to practice law was arbitrary or
irrational. And the Court did so without any examination into the
irrationality or arbitrariness of this restriction. True, three of the
dissenters in Slaughter-House concurred in the judgment.64 So
Barrett is correct to suggest that, for these three justices, the

60. Barrett, supra note 50, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
61. 83 U.S. 36, 124 (1872).
62. See Randy E. Barnett, The Three Narratives of Slaughter-House, 41 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 295 (2016).
63. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
64. Id. at 139 (Bradley, J. concurring).
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outcome would have been the same under the standard that I
propose.
But, unlike Justice Miller, Justice Bradley was forced to
explain why Myra’s exclusion was not arbitrary, and the reasons
he articulated provided women’s rights advocates with a rallying
cry. In contrast, according to the majority’s approach, a court
need not even inquire into the basis of the law. So, while the case
would likely have come out the same under either approach, with
mine, Myra Bradwell had a chance of success. And, even if she
lost, the court’s reasoning could have been criticized and used as
a basis for change in the future.
Furthermore, in Bradwell, Chief Justice Chase dissented not
only from Miller’s majority opinion but “from all the opinions” in
the case,65 including Justice Bradley’s. Even in 1873, when
opinions of women were highly sexist, the Chief Justice would
have upheld Myra Bradwell’s challenge as an irrational or
arbitrary restriction on her right to pursue a lawful occupation.
So, under the standard I propose, one justice would have reached
a different result.
In Plessy, the Court asserted that: “[W]e cannot say that a
law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two
races in public conveyances is unreasonable.”66 Most likely, like
the majority in Bradwell, they would have upheld segregation
regardless of what record was developed below. But relying on
Slaughter-House, the Court needed no such record to reach its
conclusion. Consequently, the Court did not even have to
consider whether the state’s claim to be preserving the public
order was plausible. How convenient for them. The judicial
restraint of the Democratic Constitution took them completely
out of the picture.
As with Chief Justice Chase’s dissent in Bradwell, in Plessy,
the more realistic assessment of this exercise of the police power
justified a solo dissent by Justice Harlan. So here too, the different
standard made a difference; the difference between a unanimous
decision and one accompanied by a contemporaneous dissenting
opinion to explain to the public and posterity why the majority
was wrong.

65.
66.

Id. at 142 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896).
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The fact that such a law would get scrutiny today shows that
courts are quite capable of supplying it. So, where there is the will
to ensure that the liberty of We the People is not irrationally or
arbitrarily restricted, there is a way—provided that courts
appreciate their essential role as servants of the sovereign people,
including individual citizens like Myra Bradwell and Homer
Plessy.
Finally, like other authors, Barrett mentions my
“presumption of liberty”: Under “Barnett’s Republican
Constitution . . . [r]ather than treating legislation as presumptively
constitutional, they must treat the citizen’s challenge as
presumptively correct.”67 As she acknowledges, however, in this
book, I say very little about putting the thumb on the scale for the
citizen against the state: just two paragraphs. Indeed, after a long
discussion of the lower court opinion in Lee Optical, I note that
“who bears the formal burden of proof may be less important for
preserving the sovereignty of the people than that courts
realistically assess the rationality and arbitrariness, even if the
legislature is given the benefit of the doubt” (p. 243).
Given the professed sympathy of modern law professors for
so-called “legal realism,” ironically, in my book I am merely
advocating realism over formalism. I am skeptical that the legal
realists were really all that interested in realism. In the end, as
soon as they had the votes, they replaced realist “Brandeis briefs”
with a formal presumption of constitutionality, which eventually
was deemed to be irrebuttable, and therefore ceased to be a true
“presumption.”
In my jaundiced opinion, assertions of “realism” and
“restraint” were merely useful arguments to advance the
progressive political agenda of the Legal Realists. Likewise,
today’s progressives are interested in “judicial restraint” and
deference to the majoritarian branches only when the laws they
like are being challenged as unconstitutional.
Like others, Barrett refers to my approach as “libertarian,”68
yet all I am asking for is realism. If such realism cuts in a
“libertarian” direction, then that is more a reflection on

67. Barrett, supra note 50, at 62.
68. Barrett, supra note 50, at 76 (referring to “Barnett’s generally libertarian
approach”).
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legislatures and what they are “really” up to most of the time than
it is on my priors.
SANFORD LEVINSON
While it was still in manuscript, I delivered talks on my book
at Yale and Harvard. Jack Balkin commented on my book at
Yale, and Sandy Levinson commented at Harvard. Both Balkin
and Levinson expressed objections to my use of the term
“republican,” saying pretty much what they now say in greater
depth in their contributions to this symposium. Having responded
to Balkin’s objection above, let me now further elaborate in
response to Levinson’s.
Progressives are highly possessive of the term “republican.”
Around the time of the bicentennial they relished the historical
claim that the Founders were more communitarian and less
“liberal” than most Americans then believed. And they did so
under the rubric “civic republicanism.” Balkin’s paper presents
the relevant literature, and I am not in a position to challenge that
historiography. I do recall, however, that when I read Gordon
Wood’s Creation of the American Republic, it was my impression
that many of the quotes he included in the footnotes did not
completely align with the characterizations in the text.
So I was not at all surprised that my use of the term
“republican” would raise some hackles among those who felt they
had trademarked the term. And in the final version of the book, I
responded to this objection with a defense of my using the term
“republican,” in contrast with the term “democratic.”69 A portion
of this defense is so basic that it could be characterized as
syllogistic:

c

In his book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, Levinson
insisted that the U.S. Constitution is “undemocratic”;
In my book, I explain how the Founders quite consciously
rejected the forms of state governments as “too
democratic”;
The Founders called their “undemocratic” constitution
“republican”;

69.

See pp. 26–28 (section discussing “Reclaiming the Label ‘Republican’”).
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Ergo, it is fair of me to call the U.S. Constitution
“republican” in contrast with a democratic constitution
of the sort that Levinson favors.
It is really that simple. Levinson’s beef is with the Founders who
called
their
newfangled
“undemocratic”
constitution
“republican”—not with me.
In responding to Balkin’s objection above, I defended my
claim that identifying the Constitution as republican because it
was undemocratic is fair. So let me now move on to the substance
of Levinson’s critique, which perhaps is more accurately called a
“list of grievances.” I can only consider a few.
Levinson disputes my historiography of the Republican
Party:
His version of the Republican Party—and, therefore, a
constitution ostensibly identified with that Party—requires
that he ruthlessly ignore or dismiss not only a number of
contemporary differences between the two parties with regard
to the liberties they emphasize (or choose to ignore), but also
the views of many officials elected over time under the
Republican banner.70

This charge is in tension, however, with his acknowledging
that I label Republican Teddy Roosevelt a progressive and that
“readers may be surprised to discover” from my book “that
Herbert Hoover was also a dangerous progressive.”71 To this he
adds the entirely accurate description of Republican Robert Bork
as adhering to the stance I call the Democratic Constitution, as
did John Roberts. Of course, I make clear throughout the book
that many Republicans have long accepted the Democratic
Constitution, and were also progressives. That was the point of
my discussion of Roosevelt and Hoover. Indeed, the
“progressive” and “democratic” judicial philosophy of
Republicans Bork and Roberts is the principal target of my book!
Of course, if readers are surprised to read that Hoover was a
progressive, it is because he has for so long been demonized as a
laissez-faire “conservative.” As Levinson concedes, “One can
certainly argue that [Hoover] has been unfairly typecast as a
70. Sanford Levinson, Randy Barnett’s Critique of Democracy (and John Marshall?),
32 CONST. COMMENT. 113, 118 (2016).
71. Id. at 119.
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simple-mindedly reactionary villain jousting against the heroic
Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal.”72 Indeed. In a book for a
popular audience, counteracting that “typecasting” is an
important step in developing an alternate narrative.
My alternative narrative is one that seeks to counter balance
the narrative to which the general audience at whom this book is
aimed is unrelentingly subjected today in both schools and in the
popular culture. Not only do today’s readers need to be reminded
that Roosevelt and Hoover were progressive Republicans who
adhered to the Democratic Constitution and appointed justices
like Republican Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., they need to be
reminded just how egregiously wrong were the Nineteenthcentury Progressives, with whom latter-day Progressives so
proudly identify.73
Today’s readers also need reminding
that the Republican Party was founded in opposition to
the democratic vision of majoritarian “popular
sovereignty” advanced by the Democratic Party in
defense of slavery in the territories;
that it was the Republican Congress which repeatedly
passed civil rights acts in the 1860s and 70s, which were
then nullified by majoritarian Republican-nominated
justices;
that it was a Republican, Justice John Marshall Harlan,
who dissented from these decisions;
that it was Republican administrations who continued to
enforce the laws that remained on the books until the
election of Democrat President Grover Cleveland;
that progressive Democrat Woodrow Wilson segregated
the federal government by race; and
that a Republican President, Dwight Eisenhower,
nominated a Republican Governor, Earl Warren, to be
Chief Justice.
To this list of reminders, I might also have added that it was
a Republican President who sent federal troops to Little Rock to
enforce the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings against a

72.
73.

Id. at 120.
See THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS, AND
AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2016).
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recalcitrant Democratic governor; that Martin Luther King, like
most blacks then, was a Republican; and that, due to opposition
by Democrats, the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s would not have
passed without Republican support in Congress; indeed, that such
measures garnered a higher proportion of Republican than
Democratic support. The voting breakdown by party was:
The original House version:
Democratic Party: 152–96 (61–39%)
Republican Party: 138–34 (80–20%)

Cloture in the Senate:
Democratic Party: 44–23 (66–34%)
Republican Party: 27–6 (82–18%)

The Senate version:
Democratic Party: 46–21 (69–31%)
Republican Party: 27–6 (82–18%)

The Senate version, voted on by the House:
Democratic Party: 153–91 (63–37%)
Republican Party: 136–35 (80–20%)74

Perhaps none of this is news to academic readers of this
scholarly article.75 But do these readers present these facts to their
students when conveying their narratives in class or in their
writings? Not when I was a law student, they didn’t, and I doubt
any but a few do today.
I can assure Levinson that most readers of my book are well
aware of the self-congratulatory stance that today’s Democrats
74. See DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE
US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 311 n.1 (1995).
75. On the crucial role that Republicans played in enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1964, see 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 121
(2014) (“Liberal Democrats could not supply the sixty-seven votes needed to stop the
filibuster [by southern Democrats] without Republican support; only Dirksen, the party’s
leader in the Senate, could supply the extra votes for the requisite supermajority.”).
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take towards the role some Democrats played in securing passage
of the Civil Rights acts of the 1960s, dismissing Democrat
opponents of such measures as “Dixiecrats” and highlighting the
opposition to the passage of the 1964 Act by Republicans such as
Barry Goldwater. In my book, I offer these countervailing facts,
not to make Republicans heroes but to provide a “republican
narrative” that modern-day Republicans can and should embrace.
As the title of his essay suggests, Levinson contends that my
real target is not the Progressives but John Marshall. And I admit
that, after Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Marshall is among my least
favorite justices. But, while I cannot contest modern historians’
claims about civic republicanism, I can contest the Progressives’
claims merely to be following the lead of “the Great Chief
Justice.”76 They have accomplished this by selectively reading out
of the Marshall opinions the parts that Levinson complains I
quote.
So in his reply, he reiterates the famous parts of Marshall’s
opinions that law professors stress. To his credit, he concedes: “It
is not that one cannot read McCulloch more restrictively.”77 But
this restrictive reading, he insists, “is not in fact the message that
has been drawn from the case over its now almost-200-year
history.”78 And he is “quite confident that it is idiosyncratic in the
extreme to read McCulloch as a case whose central meaning is in
fact the limitations on the powers of the national government.”79
Levinson then reiterates the expansively-worded passages of
Gibbons that law professors have long emphasized: The
commerce power of Congress extends to “commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in
a state, or between different parts of the same state” if that
commerce “affect[s] other states” and that “[c]omprehensive as
the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more states than one.”80
Levinson concludes his exegesis of McCulloch and Gibbons
by accusing me of “construct[ing] a fictitious history of unbroken
constitutional fidelity” by failing “to recognize the responsibility
of Marshall himself for the [capacious] constitutional vision
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Levinson, supra note 70, at 132.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137 (his emphasis).
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that . . . Marshall instantiated.”81 Oh, I recognize it all right. Both
McCulloch, Gibbons, and Marshall himself are grist for my mill in
Restoring the Lost Constitution.82
Yet the point I make in Our Republican Constitution is that
neither case goes as far as the Progressives maintained when they
used these opinions of the Great Chief Justice to assert their
fidelity to the written Constitution. Indeed, as I noted above,83 this
was the publicly-expressed view of John Marshall when defending
himself from the charge that McCulloch was latitudinarian.
Seriously, if Gibbons plus McCulloch were really taken at the
time to have been as “capaciously” read as the Progressives later
claimed—and Levinson still claims—about the scope of federal
power, would there have been any need for the Thirteenth
Amendment? Would not Congress have had the power to abolish
the economic activity of slavery “which is completely internal,
which is carried on between man and man in a state,” for surely
this commerce “concerned more states than one” and “affect[ed]
other states?”84
Yet, to my knowledge, even the most creative antislavery
lawyers—including my own personal favorites Lysander Spooner
and Salmon Chase—did not imagine Congress had such a power,
much less that Gibbons and McCulloch had already so ruled!85
True, some employed the precedent of Story’s egregious (and
very modernly-reasoned) reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in Prigg v. Pennsylvania86 to contend that Congress had a
sweeping power to enforce various rights guarantees in the
original Constitution on behalf of slaves.
For example, Joel Tiffany relied on Prigg in support of his
contention that “all the rights and immunities guaranteed by the
Constitution to the citizen of the United States, can be secured by
81.
82.

Id. at 138.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 171–80 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing McCulloch); id. at 294–97
(discussing Gibbons).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 8–12.
84. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824).
85. See Randy E. Barnett, The Continuing Relevance Of The Original Meaning Of
The Thirteenth Amendment, GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2016); Randy E. Barnett,
Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011) (chronicling the arguments that antislavery constitutionalists
did make).
86. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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the Federal Government, and for this end they have a right to pass
all the laws necessary for the enforcement of those guarantys.”87
But I know of no antislavery constitutionalist who thought Prigg
was a defensible extension of McCulloch, or that either case
justified Congress to use its commerce power to prohibit slavery
within a state.
Even after emancipating most of the slaves in a variety of
ways and winning the Civil War, the most radical Republicans in
Congress did not believe they had a power to abolish slavery
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. In
James Oakes’ extensive examination of the myriad legislative
devices employed by Republicans to restrict slavery prior to the
Thirteenth Amendment, the commerce power is not even
mentioned.88 To gain the power that past and present Progressives
claim already existed, Republicans believed a constitutional
amendment was both necessary and worth fighting strenuously
for.
Indeed in the wake of the Civil War, the Chase court adhered
to what I have contended was the original meaning of the
Commerce Clause.89 But if the Republicans and the Chase Court
were right, then the Progressives were wrong, and remain wrong.
And so too is Levinson wrong to claim an “almost-200-year”
pedigree for the Progressives’ reading of Gibbons and McCulloch
that renders mine “idiosyncratic in the extreme.” While I am quite
prepared to take on the bitter of John Marshall’s loosey goosey
opinions and to criticize him for it, I am entitled to quote the
sweet parts of these canonical cases—even the parts that don’t fit
the narrative of the “New Deal Constitution.”
Like Barrett and Mazzone, Levinson seems to be imputing
what he knows are my libertarian politics and policy preferences

87. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
IN RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT 100 (1849); see also id. at 138–41.
88. See JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES 1861–1865 (2013).
89. See U.S. v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 43–44 (1869) (invalidating a lamp oil
prohibition as beyond both the taxing and commerce powers of Congress) (“[T]his express
grant of power to regulate commerce among the States has always been understood as
limited by its terms; and as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade
and business of the separate States; except, indeed, as a necessary and proper means for
carrying into execution some other power expressly granted or vested.” (emphasis added)).
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to what I am claiming that courts should do. But, in what is
probably my favorite passage of his essay, he says:
No attractive world would come to an end if courts were more
inclined to monitor such patent rent-seeking in circumstances
where the assertion of a public purpose is implausible (even if
not outright “lunatic” as presumably required by the most
austere version of “minimum rationality”).90

I entirely agree with this. Both ideally and in practice, most
laws and regulations would pass a realistic rationality and
arbitrariness reviews. Mine is actually a very modest proposal that
would yield modest results. At its core, it merely requires that
legislatures exercise their powers in good faith and with a
modicum of care. Perhaps it is a measure of just how extreme is
the formalism of today’s “rational basis” review, that even a
proposal as modestly realist as mine seems radical.
For me, there is a difference between what is constitutional
under our Republican Constitution and every particular of what I
might favor as public policy. I understand how, in a day and age
in which everything that is “good” must ipso facto be
constitutional, that might be a difficult claim to credit. Levinson
asks skeptically: “Is it really the case that Barnett would be
satisfied to stop with the invalidation of ridiculous laws limiting
the liberty interests of would-be florists or opticians devoted to
reducing the prices of duplicate glasses?”91
If my answer to this question is “yes,” do I win the debate?
Can I still win if laws that are not “ridiculous” on their face—like
Hialeah’s ordinance banning animal sacrifice92 or Texas’s
restrictions on abortion clinics93—turn out, upon examination, to
be “arbitrary”? What about laws that may not seem “ridiculous”

90. Levinson, supra note 70, at 127–28.
91. Id. at 128.
92. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561 (1993)
(citing Michael McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) (“[A] regulation is not neutral in an
economic sense if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater
costs on religious than on comparable nonreligious activities.”)).
93. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016) (“[T]his
record evidence, along with the absence of any evidence to the contrary, provides ample
support for the District Court’s conclusion that ‘[m]any of the building standards
mandated by the act and its implementing rules have such a tangential relationship to
patient safety in the context of abortion as to be nearly arbitrary.’”).
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when enacted, but come later to be seen as irrationally based on
prejudice or junk science?
Many of Levinson’s grievances about my reading of our
Republican Constitution involve, not a claim that we need to
impose restrictions on liberty, but claims about the need for
income redistribution and other uses of the tax and spending
powers. About these I say nothing in my book. Like my last book,
Restoring the Lost Constitution, this new one is about restrictions
on our liberty, or freedom of action—on our ability to do what we
will with what is ours. I assume that, in our constitutional order,
general taxation and government spending is constitutional,
however unlibertarian that may be. As Levinson does to his credit
with the Second Amendment, I take the Sixteenth Amendment
as I find it. While elsewhere I do advocate its repeal in favor of a
national sales tax,94 I do not advocate that judges ignore or
“interpret” away the text to reach libertarian ends.
So both because I don’t talk about taxing and spending, and
because irrationality and arbitrariness review would be rather
modest in its effects on regulations, Levinson is right when he
says, “Barnett might complain that I am overestimating the
degree to which he is a radical individualist.”95 But this is because,
as already mentioned, there is a difference between how radical
an individualist I might be as a policy matter, and how I read the
original meaning of the Constitution we have.96
Far more “radical” in its effect would be for courts to enforce
the structural constraints on Congress’s power that Levinson and
Balkin call “hardwired.” This includes its enumerated powers, as
well as its power to delegate its legislative powers to the executive
branch. But even here, this proposal should be more acceptable
to a small “d” democrat like Levinson than he is prepared to
acknowledge.
As he notes with respect to health care laws, limiting the
power of Congress does not eliminate the power of government.
It simply says which governments should address a policy
problem. State governments are government too, and are at least
as democratic as is the Congress, and arguably far more

9.

94.
95.
96.

See BARNETT, supra note 82, at 416.
Levinson, supra note 70, at 128.
See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution Libertarian?, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV.

/
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accountable to their people. On democratic grounds, then, why
not let Brandeis’s laboratories of regulatory experimentation
operate there?
To this, Levinson asserts that federalism provides an
inadequate check on potentially tyrannical state governments:
We must take essentially on faith that this capacity for tyranny
will be adequately limited by the fact that states can compete
with one another and that relatively random individuals can
engage in their right to “foot-vote” by declaring they’re mad as
hell and will not take it anymore as they move to a more
compatible state.97

But, under the approach of our Republican Constitution, we
need not take this on faith. In this part of his article, Levinson
seems to have forgotten the part of my thesis he criticizes earlier
in his: that federal courts should police state exercises of their
police powers by invalidating irrational or arbitrary – and
therefore “tyrannical”—state regulations under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See how coherently our Republican Constitution
can operate?
By the same token, on democratic grounds, why does he not
demand that our elected Congress make its own laws, rather than
pass vague aspirational policy objectives, and then let unelected,
unaccountable executive branch regulators make the rules that
actually bind We the People? If that is too much work for our 535
servants, then that is all the more reason to let the fifty
democratically-elected state legislatures in on the action.
Of course, we all know the answer to why everything must be
moved to the national level. It is precisely because foot voting by
individuals and companies is indeed a greater constraint on the
exercise of government power by states than is “democratic”
ballot voting at the federal level.
Moreover, I never proposed to abolish elections—indeed my
Bill of Federalism proposal for constitutional amendments
includes a call for term limits.98 You don’t get rotation in office
without elections. The claims that foot voting is a more effective
means for individuals to protect their own interests than ballot
voting, and that, when most power is exercised by competing state
governments, foot voting provides a more potent check on the
97.
98.

Levinson, supra note 70, at 136.
See BARNETT, supra note 82, at 415.
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scope of government power, is not to claim that ballot voting has
no value at all. As I say in the Introduction, “those who hold a
republican or individualist vision of popular sovereignty will
acknowledge that popular elections provide a vital constraint on
the exercise of power by the agents or servants of the people” (pp.
25-26).
The debate is not, therefore, over whether to have elections,
but over what elections mean. For adherents to the Democratic
Constitution, elections express the “will of the people” who are
entitled to rule. Except in extraordinary circumstances, thwarting
this majoritarian will is deemed to be illegitimate. The
problematic nature of allowing unelected, unaccountable, judges
to invalidate expressions of the will of the people even has its own
technical name: the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”99
For adherents to the Republican Constitution, elections
serve as a vital check on the power of the servants of the people
by their masters. In agency law, an agent must act on behalf of the
principal and subject to his or her control.100 Elections provide a
semblance of such control. But, under a Republican Constitution,
judges too are servants of the people, whose job it is to fairly
adjudicate claims made by a jointly-sovereign individual citizen,
that his or her agents have acted ultra vires or beyond the proper
scope of their just powers.
So not only do I embrace elections, as explained above, but
my proposal that judges fully enforce our Republican
Constitution’s structural constraints of federalism and separation
of powers, would result in more decision-making by
democratically-elected state legislators and fewer by unelected
federal functionaries in the executive-administrative state.101
Consequently, if elected legislators in fifty states are making more
of the laws (subject to the judicial guardrails provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment), and Congress is stopped by the courts
from offloading its law-making duties to unelected executive
branch bureaucrats, there would be more, not less, electoral
accountability than we have today.
99. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
100. See Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1981 (1987).
101. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE UNLAWFUL? (2014)
(criticizing the prerogative powers of the executive administrative state).
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So, for a true democrat like Sandy Levinson, what’s not to
like?
LAWRENCE SOLUM
I have already noted Larry Solum’s defense of my project
against critics who may accuse it of historical inaccuracy when
employing the label “republican.” Like Monsieur Jourdain’s
discovery that he had “been speaking prose all my life, and didn’t
even know it,”102 I now discover that I have been engaged in
“metalinguistic contestation” without realizing it.
But this was just a preface to his article presenting “a
republican theory of constitutionalism” that “explains the ways in
which republican virtue and republican liberty might provide a
normatively attractive constitutional vision that supplements,
extends, and enriches the vision offered in Our Republican
Constitution.”103 In his rich essay, Solum defends the following
propositions.
Republican liberty requires that society be organized in
such a way that individuals and their communities will
flourish; hence, peace and prosperity are perquisites for
freedom.
Republican liberty requires that society be organized in
such a way that individuals develop the capacity for selfgovernment; the formation of virtuous character should
be a central aim of legislation, especially in the realm of
the family and the educational system.
Republican liberty requires the creation of conditions
under which individuals can become economically selfreliant and independent of others, masters of their own
lives, and not depend on either government or a private
entity to the degree that they become mastered by
others.104
As someone with an Aristotelian-Thomist background and
bent, I am quite attracted to his account. In the limited space I
have here, I cannot provide a full evaluation of its merits, but wish
to stress one point in particular. We hear a lot about “selfgovernment” by those who adhere to the Democratic
102.
103.
104.

MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN.
Solum, supra note 31, at 182.
Id. at 199.
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Constitution. For it is supposedly by elections and referenda that
“the people govern themselves.” However, as I have contended
in both Our Republican Constitution and Restoring the Lost
Constitution, this is a myth and a potentially pernicious one.
For, in the name of “self-government,” the Democratic
Constitution licenses the exercise of power by a majority of a
handful of individuals designated “legislators” and even, in our
current system, the faceless individual bureaucrats to whom these
“legislators” have delegated their powers. Because an individual
can consent to nearly anything—from entering a boxing ring to
having sex with another person—when it is fictitiously claimed
that you have to have consented to delegate power to a group of
strangers, these strangers can then assert this faux-consent to
justify their authority to do pretty much anything to you that they
like. Consent is simply too powerful a mechanism to be fictitiously
allocated to others.
Solum correctly distinguishes this collective conception of
self-government from the Republican conception of “selfgovernance” as literally the government of one’s own self:
“Republican constitutionalism emphasizes government of the
individual by the individual.”105 That is what individual
sovereignty means.
As I explain in The Structure of Liberty, natural rights define
the boundaries within which persons should be free to make their
own choices—to truly govern themselves—subject to the like
liberty of their fellow citizens and joint sovereigns.106 Or as Solum
puts it: “For a republican constitution on Barnett’s account, the
fundamental institutions of self-government are judiciallyenforceable,
liberty-protecting
rights
and
institutional
arrangements of executive and legislative power that aim to
minimize the rights violations and thereby preserve individual
self-government.”107
How one should live his or her own life within these
boundaries is not a political question, but a moral or ethical one.
(The 1960s leftie catch phrase “the personal is political” denies
this.) The Aristotelian natural law conception of the virtues
105. Id. at 186.
106. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
LAW 15 (2d ed. 2014) (“[N}atural law ethics purports to instruct us on how to exercise the
liberty that is defined and protected by natural rights.”).
107. Solum, supra note 31, at 186.
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instructs how one is to exercise the liberty that natural rights
defines. The Aristotelian conception of vices instructs us on what
behavior to avoid.
For an Aristotelian, however, the matter of virtue and vice is
not merely a way of behaving. It is a way of being. To be virtuous
is to habituate the virtues so they become, as it were, one’s
“second nature.” For example, most of us do not refrain from
shoplifting because we see a security camera or fear being caught
and punished. For most of us, the very idea of shoplifting never
enters our thoughts. We have been habituated to respecting the
rights of others to the degree that violating another’s rights is not
even considered an option.
Of course, there is a minority of law-abiding persons who
must consciously consider and reject the option of shop-lifting
each time they enter a store. While such persons are to be
commended for their behavior—indeed their self-restraint
requires far greater self-control on their part than if respecting the
rights of others had become their “second nature”—they are not
virtuous. If they were, the decision to refrain from shoplifting
would require no effort at all, since the very idea would not even
be present in their thoughts as an option.
But habituating one’s self to act virtuously and avoid vice
requires years of practice. The same holds for how one treats
others morally in ways that do not violate their rights. Is one kind,
generous, honest (though not to a fault), caring, empathetic, or
considerate of their feelings? All these describe how a truly
virtuous person would behave without thinking much about it.
One implication of this approach to self-governance is that to
live virtuously, to pursue happiness in the truest sense, is a do-ityourself affair. Virtue is an internal state and cannot be
commanded by others. I do not deny that compelling others to act
as they should might cause some to become virtuous out of habit.
But it can have the opposite effect on others.
As the great Aristotelian-Thomist philosopher—and my
mentor—Henry Veatch explained:
[N]o human being ever attains his natural end or perfection
save by his own personal effort and exertion. No one other than
the human individual—no agency of society, of family, of
friends, or of whatever can make or determine or program an
individual to be a good man, or live the life that a human being
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ought to live. Instead attaining one’s natural end as a human
person is nothing if not a “do-it-yourself” job.108

Veatch readily acknowledged “that one can be helped in a
variety of ways in attaining one’s natural perfection. Friends,
family, the various institutions of society—even good fortune—
can all contribute mightily to a person’s attaining his goal or
natural end.”109 Nevertheless, however, “the actual business of
attaining the end—living wisely and intelligently—is something
that only the individual can do.”110 (I might mention that Henry
was no political conservative or libertarian, but was a
conventional liberal Democrat.)
It does no good to undermine the necessary prerequisite to
the pursuit of happiness that is the individual liberty defined by
our natural rights to provide the other material goods that
happiness also requires. A well-crafted system of private
property, freedom of contract, self-defense, and restitution
secures that liberty.111 If a free market system is not enough to
provide material well-being by means of voluntary exchanges
that also benefit others as well as oneself—or by means of private
charity—these ways to acquire material goods can be
supplemented by tax and spending programs.
As mentioned briefly above, I freely acknowledge that, under
our Republican Constitution, government has the power to tax
and spend; and I distinguish this from its power to regulate
rightful and prohibit wrongful behavior. Further, I assume that
the use of the tax and spending powers to redistribute wealth is
constitutional—at least at the state level.112 But such a system
108.
109.
110.

HENRY B. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? 84 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 84–85. For more on Veatch’s account of Aristotelian ethics, see HENRY B.
VEATCH, RATIONAL MAN: A MODERN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS
(2003); see also HENRY B. VEATCH, ARISTOTLE: A CONTEMPORARY APPRECIATION
(1974) (explicating Aristotelian philosophy more generally).
111. See generally BARNETT, supra note 106 (defending the social function and
necessity of these fundamental rights).
112. As Sandy Levinson notes in his paper, the debate over whether federal tax
revenues can be spent for purposes or objects that are not enumerated in the Constitution
dates back to the debates between Hamilton and the federalists, and their republican
opponents on the constitutionality of so-called “public improvements.” See Levinson,
supra note 70, at 138 (discussing Madison’s veto of a federal public improvements act on
the ground that it was unconstitutional). See also Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare
Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1
(2003). But, once again, this is not a debate over whether government can tax and spend
for this purpose but which government in our federal system is empowered to do so.
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must be designed and administered with great care, lest it actually
be counterproductive.
In discussing the role that virtue plays in the pursuit of
happiness—and the nature of virtue—I have perhaps said too
much on a subject about which I claim no professional expertise.
But to fully appreciate the reasons why the individual popular
sovereignty that recognizes and protects individual selfgovernance is a vital means to the end of a free and virtuous
people, it is worth at least identifying this approach to virtuous
self-governance.
True, although such individual sovereignty is necessary to the
pursuit of happiness, it is not sufficient to its attainment. But
whatever else may be required must be achieved consistently with
the individual sovereignty or “republican liberty,” without which
virtue and happiness are impossible.
Which is yet another reason to favor our Republican
Constitution that is based on the sovereignty of We the People,
each and every one.

